Fatality assessment for high pressure reactor of methanol production plantsfrom CO2 hydrogenation / Mohd Aizad Ahmad and Zulkifli Abdul Rashid by Ahmad, Mohd Aizad & Abdul Rashid, Zulkifli
Malaysian Journal of Chemical Engineering & Technology 2 (2019) 26–40 
 
 
Malaysian Journal of Chemical Engineering & Technology 
 
Journal Homepage: www.mjcetfkk.uitm.edu.my 
 
                              www.mjcetfkk.uitm.edu.my                                                                                                                 26 
Fatality assessment for high pressure reactor of methanol production plants from  
CO2 hydrogenation 
 
Mohd Aizad bin Ahmad* and Zulkifli bin Abdul Rashid 
aFaculty of Chemical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Selangor, Malaysia 
 
*Corresponding email: mohdaizad@salam.uitm.edu.my 
 
Abstract  Article Info 
New technology emerges for carbon dioxide hydrogenation where captured carbon dioxide reacts 
with hydrogen for methanol production using high pressure condition up to 442 bar. The research on 
high pressure process focus on how much percentage of carbon dioxide and hydrogen converted, 
accompanied with how much percentage of methanol selectivity. There is no comprehensive study 
on safety, especially in term of consequences to human fatalities if incident occurred at this high-
pressure plant. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to assess percentage of fatalities occur for 
reactor methanol (MeOH) plant operates at high pressure of 442 bar. It studies the possibility on (i) 
various events occurred in term of toxicity, thermal radiation, and overpressure; and (ii) estimation 
of  percentage of fatalities when all that events occurred in comparison with reference plant operating 
at reactor pressure of 76 bar. Process plant is simulated using HYSYS and the obtained mass density 
of mixture, mass fraction, and volume fraction of chemical are used to calculate amount of toxicity 
(ppm), thermal radiation (kW/m2), and overpressure (psi) using consequence model simulated in 
ALOHA software. Threat zones generated by ALOHA software are then exported to the MARPLOT 
software to observe the area affected by the case study. The studied methanol reactor releases 
chemical mixture consists of hydrogen, carbon dioxide, MeOH, carbon monoxide (CO), and water, 
which only water is not considered as hazardous material. The release of chemical mixture observed 
for 10 mm, 25 mm, and 160 mm leakage, simulated at day and night conditions. The result for plant 
that operates at pressure of 442 bar has the highest severity of 44% fatality, which comes from the 
event of flammable methanol jet fire at daytime, leakage of 160 mm hole size. Meanwhile, for plant 
operating at 76 bar, the highest fatality is 27%, occurred from toxicity release of carbon dioxide at 
nighttime, leakage of 160 mm hole size. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Global temperature has increased rapidly for the past 
50 years (MacMillan, 2016). By definition, global 
warming means the rise of Earth’s average atmospheric 
temperature that makes changes in the climate 
temperature due to the greenhouse effect, where 
greenhouse effect refers to the heating phenomenon of 
the atmosphere that traps heat radiating from earth 
towards the space. Water vapour, carbon dioxide, 
methane, and nitrogen oxide are the gasses that act as 
thermal blanket for the Earth to absorb heat and warm 
the Earth’s surface (Lallanila, 2016). The most important 
component of the greenhouse gases is carbon dioxide.  
In 2015, 195 countries have agreed on a plan to 
reduce the emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases 
at the United Nations Climate Change Conference held 
in Paris, with the aim to reduce the temperature of Earth 
where the increase should not be more than 2 °C 
(Anderson et al., 2016). As fossil fuels are burnt, the 
concentration of CO2 also increases by the year, which 
result in the warming of the planet and increases the 
natural greenhouse effects (Anderson et al., 2016). In 
2013, 58% of the CO2 from human source is contributed 
by the burning of fossil fuels, cement production and 
deforestation, as a result of human activities. There are 
also natural sources of CO2, which are decomposition, 
ocean release, and respiration. Since the Industrial 
Revolution, the concentration of CO2 of the atmosphere 
has risen extensively and reached a dangerous level 
(Levin, 2013).  
Solutions for this problem have been found including 
energy efficient renewable energy production and CO2 
capture and storage (CCS). CCS is an effective strategy 
to reach CO2 mitigation target while sustaining the 
source of energy supply. To make the CCS practicable, 
economical methods to capture CO2 from flue gases of 
power plants and to store the captured CO2 are needed 
(Liu et al, 2012). One of the most profound, practical 
methods for CO2 capture is chemical absorption due to 
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the availability of the solvent and established techniques 
(Ikmal et al., 2016). After capturing the CO2, it is then 
transported to suitable sites for storage such as deep 
oceans, depleted oil reservoir, and deep saline aquifers. 
Other than CCS, there is another method for carbon 
capture called carbon captured and utilisation (CCU). In 
CCU, when the CO2 has been captured, it needs to be 
utilised. One of the CO2 utilisations is to produce 
methanol (MeOH). MeOH is an important chemical in 
the chemical industry, where it can further produce other 
chemicals such as formaldehyde and acetic acid that are 
used to produce various products, for instance, washer 
fluid, solvents, and subfloors. In this production, 
methanol is produced by reacting hydrogen (H2), that 
comes from water electrolysis with CO2 from the flue 
gas that had been captured (Bellotti et al., 2017). The 
production of methanol involved reaction between CO2 
and H2 as raw material with catalyst of Cu/ZnO/Al2O3. 
This reaction is called as CO2 hydrogenation, where the 
products of this reaction are methanol and water, with 
carbon monoxide (CO) as the by-product.  
Safety is a very important study in plant construction. 
A quantitative safety study is conducted using fatality 
assessment (FA). The FA permits the quantification of 
the severity of an installation in order to deliver data for 
their acceptance. It also helps in making decisions and 
arrangement of choices so as to reduce unacceptable 
ones. It shows the risk caused by some activities and 
gives related evidence about the acceptability of the 
activity to the competent authorities (Di Domenico et al., 
2014). Therefore, the use of CO2 as raw material needs a 
thorough safety study since CO2 can be hazardous 
because it exhibits a level of toxicity that may lead to the 
occurrence of major accidents (Wilday et al., 2009).  
The study of methanol production at high pressure 
condition up to 442 bar from CO2 hydrogenation has 
been conducted for lab scale experiments              
(Gaikwad et al., 2016) but they only analysed on the 
methanol selectivity, conversion of CO2 and H2 without 
considering the safety assessment. Another assessment, 
at production scale methanol plant has been proposed by 
Van-Dal and Bouallou (2013) with another effort by 
Pérez-Fortes et al. (2016), however, their research 
limited to the economic and energy assessment, at 76 bar 
pressure condition with no safety related assessment at 
higher pressure (pressure more than 76 bar).Therefore, 
the purpose of this paper is to simulate high pressure 
methanol production plant using 76 bar and 442 bar in 
the reactor, and to assess the fatalities of the methanol 
production plant. 
2.0 Methodology 
Two plants producing methanol from CO2 
hydrogenation in Seri Manjung, Perak were simulated 
using simulator software (Aspen HYSYS) with different 
conditions before entering the reactor. The conditions for 
Plant 1 are 76 bar with outlet temperature of 288 °C and 
Plant 2 at 442 bar with outlet temperature of 288 °C. 
2.1 Plant location  
This plant is suggested to be built in Seri Manjung, 
Perak, near the Sultan Azlan Shah Power Station. The 
location was chosen because the carbon will be captured 
from this power plant as the raw material to be used. The 
location is as in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Location chosen to build the plant in Manjung, Perak. 
2.2 Process plant description 
To produce methanol in this plant, a one-step 
reaction, that is the hydrogenation of CO2, is employed; 
the equation is as in the Eq. (1), (2), and (3). The raw 
material is the CO2 that had been captured from the flue 
gas of power plant by post-combustion method, while H2 
is from the electrolysis of water, where the water 
molecule is broken down into hydrogen and oxygen. The 
catalysts used in this reaction were Cu/ZnO/Al2O3. 
CO2(g) + 3H2(g)⇄ CH3OH(g) + H2O(g); 
∆H298K,5MPa = −40.9 kJ/mol                                        
CO2(g) + H2(g) ⇄ CO(g) + H2O(g)      
 ∆H298K,5MPa = +49.8 kJ/mol                                     
CO(g) + 2H2(g) ⇄ CH3OH(g)                            
∆H298K,5MPa = −90.7 kJ/mol                                      
 
Chosen location 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
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2.3 Meteorological data of selected location 
The meteorological data for Manjung was assessed 
using weather station at Sitiawan, a small district in 
Manjung. Table 1 shows the meteorological data used to 
simulate events occurred for all case studies. Wind 
direction of W means that the wind coming from West 
direction to East direction, SSW (south-southwest) 
direction to NNE (north northeast) and WNW (west-
northwest) to ESE (east-southeast). 
 
Table 1: Meteorological data of Manjung, Perak. 
Period 
Air 
Temp. 
(°C) 
Humidity 
(%) 
Wind 
velocity 
(m/s) 
Stability 
class 
Wind 
direction 
Day 29 84 2.23 B 
W, 
SSW, 
WNW 
Night 29 84 1.03 F 
W, 
SSW, 
WNW 
2.4 Properties of carbon dioxide 
Carbon dioxide is the molecule that occurs naturally, 
which consists of one carbon atom and two oxygen 
atoms with the formula of CO2. CO2 is a colourless and 
odourless molecule with a molecular weight of 44.01 
g/mole. It is a non-flammable molecule and is stable 
under atmospheric condition. CO2 can be used to 
eradicate the fire, where it can take away the oxygen 
element of the fire triangle. The melting point and 
boiling point of CO2 are −56.56 °C and −78.46 °C, 
respectively. The density and vapour pressure of CO2 at 
20 °C are 1.84 g/L and 56.5 atm, respectively. It reacts 
vigorously with substance such as ammonia and amines. 
Carbonic acid can be produced when CO2 dissolves in 
water, which can lead to corrosion effect on carbon steel 
and a few non-ferrous metals (Linde AG, 2001). 
2.5 Properties of hydrogen 
Hydrogen is the simplest chemical molecule. It 
consists of two hydrogen atoms that bonded together and 
has the formula of H2. Hydrogen is a colourless and 
odourless gas that has a molecular weight of    2.02 
g/mole. It is highly flammable and has the auto ignition 
temperature of 500 °C. The melting and boiling point is 
−259.20 °C and −252.76 °C, respectively. The lower 
flammability limit and upper flammability limit are 4 and 
75 vol.%, respectively.   
Since it is highly flammable, hydrogen needs to be 
kept away from any heat, sparks, and open flame to avoid 
ignition. In order to move the hydrogen cylinders, the 
cylinder must not be dragged or rolled over; instead, an 
appropriate hand truck is to be used. The hydrogen 
cylinder has to be carefully connected with the utilisation 
equipment prior to opening the valve. This is to ensure 
that the hydrogen gas will not escape to the atmosphere 
since it has very light molecules that can disperse easily 
(Overview, 2003). 
2.6 Properties of methanol 
Methanol or methyl alcohol has a chemical formula 
of CH3OH. It is the simplest form of alcohol from a 
group of organic chemicals. Methanol has the physical 
structure as liquid that is colourless, volatile, flammable 
and soluble in water. 
The molecular weight of the methanol is                 
32.04 g/mol and it is high flammability where it can be 
ignited under almost all ambient temperature conditions. 
It has the alcoholic smells with melting point of            
−97.6 °C while the boiling point is 64.5 °C that is below 
the boiling point of water. The pH value is 7.2, which 
makes it a slightly alkaline chemical with a density of 
0.79 g/m3 at 25 °C. The auto-ignition temperature is              
464 °C, where it is the lowest temperature in the normal 
atmosphere that ignites spontaneously without external 
source of ignition. The heat of combustion and heat of 
vaporisation at 25 °C are 726.1 and 37.34 kJ/mole, 
respectively. Heat of combustion is the energy released 
in form of heat when the substance undergoes complete 
combustion with oxygen while heat of vaporisation is the 
measure of heat that needs to be absorbed if a certain 
quantity of liquid is vaporised at a constant temperature. 
Flammability limit is the concentration, where the 
molecule can cause fire in the presence of ignition 
source. The lower and upper flammability limit of 
methanol is 6 vol.% and 36 vol.%, respectively. 
Methanol is a very reactive substance and according 
to the material safety data sheet (MSDS), methanol is a 
toxic substance when exposed at high concentrations. 
Explosion can occur when it mixes with concentrated 
sulfuric acid and concentrated hydrogen peroxide. When 
methanol reacts with hypochlorous acid in water solution 
or in carbon tetrachloride solution it gives out methyl 
hypochlorite, a substance that may explode when 
exposed to sunlight or heat (Components and Limits, 
2001). 
2.7 Properties of carbon monoxide 
Carbon monoxide is a colourless, odourless gas. 
Prolonged exposure to carbon monoxide rich 
atmospheres may be fatal. It is easily ignited. It is just 
lighter than air and a flame can flash back to the source 
of leak very easily. Under prolonged exposure to fire or 
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intense heat the containers may violently rupture and 
rocket.  
Inhalation causes headache, dizziness, and weakness 
of limbs, confusion, nausea, unconsciousness, and 
finally death. Inhalation of 0.04% concentration of CO 
for 2–3 hours or 0.06% concentration in one hour can 
cause headache and discomfort. Meanwhile, 0.1–0.2% 
will produce throbbing in the head in about half an hour, 
a tendency to stagger in about one and half hour, and 
confusion, headache, and nausea in about two hours. A 
0.20–25% CO concentration usually produces 
unconsciousness in about half an hour. Inhalation of a 
0.4 % concentration can prove fatal in less than one hour 
while inhalation of higher concentrations can cause 
sudden, unexpected collapse. Contact of liquid with skin 
will cause frostbite. (USCG, 1999). 
2.8 Consequence model equation 
In order to assess fatalities, the consequences 
incidents predicted from the leakage of reactor vessel 
must be identified. The consequences incidents of gas 
mixture (CO2-H2-MeOH-CO-H2O) release to the 
atmosphere that could occur are toxic dispersion, vapour 
cloud explosion, and fire. 
2.8.1 Toxic release dispersion 
Toxic release dispersion related to the concentrations 
of a downwind release in which the gas is mixed with 
fresh air to the point that the resulting mixture can be 
evaluated using neutrally buoyant dispersion models. 
There are two common types of neutrally buoyant 
vapour cloud dispersion models, namely the plume 
model and the puff model. The steady-state 
concentration of material released from a continuous 
source is the plume model, while puff model defines the 
temporal concentration of material from a single release 
of a fixed amount of material (Daniel and Crowl, 2013). 
Eq. (4) is the basis for the dispersion model, where it 
can solve variety of cases. For this model, the coordinate 
system was used, where the x-axis is the centreline 
directly downwind from the release point and is rotated 
for different wind directions, while the y-axis is the 
distance off the centreline, and the z-axis is the elevation 
above the release point (Daniel and Crowl, 2013).  
𝛿𝐶
𝛿𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑗
𝛿𝐶
𝛿𝑥𝑗
=  
𝛿
𝛿𝑥𝑗
(𝐾𝑗
𝛿𝐶
𝛿𝑥𝑗
)                   (4) 
From Eq. (4), uj is the velocity of the air, where 
subscript j represents the summation overall coordinate 
directions x, y, and z; and C is the concentration of 
material resulting from the release. This form a specific 
case for it to be calculated. One case of puff and one case 
of plume will be studied. The case of puff studied is puff 
with instantaneous point source at ground level with its 
coordinates fixed at release point, constant wind only in 
x-direction with constant velocity, u as in Eq. (5), while 
plume studied is plume with continuous steady state 
source at ground level and wind moving in x-direction at 
constant velocity Eq. (6).  
〈𝐶〉(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) =
𝑄?̇?
√2𝜋3/2𝜎𝑥𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑧
                       
 
(5) 
〈𝐶〉(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) =
𝑄?̇?
𝜋𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑧𝑢
 
(6) 
2.8.2 Vapour cloud explosion 
Vapour cloud explosion (VCE) is a phenomena 
which a reaction front moving outward from the ignition 
source preceded by a shock wave or pressure front that 
will result in the explosion of a dust or gas. Pressure 
wave continues its outward movement, even when the 
reaction front terminates after the combustible material 
is consumed. A blast wave is composed of the pressure 
wave and subsequent wind. Most of the damage is 
caused by the blast wave (Daniel and Crowl, 2013). The 
overpressure will cause the explosion to occur and can 
be predicted using the equivalent mass of TNT and the 
distance from point of explosion, r, as in Eq. (7). Thus, 
the overpressure can then be calculated using Eq. (8). 
𝑧𝑒 =
𝑟
𝑚𝑇𝑁𝑇
1
3
 (7) 
 𝑝𝑠 =
𝑝𝑜
𝑝𝑎
=
1616[1+(
𝑧𝑒
4.5
)
2
]
√1+(
𝑧𝑒
0.048
)
2
√1+(
𝑧𝑒
0.32
)
2
√1+(
𝑧𝑒
1.35
)
2
 
 
(8) 
 
2.8.3 Flash fire 
Fire and explosion are accidents that commonly occur 
in the chemical plants, where the most common source 
is the organic solvents. Fire occur when fuel, oxidiser 
and ignition source exist simultaneously. From Eq. (9), 
Ie is the effective radiation intensity (W/m2), Qm is the 
mass release (kg), and r, is the distance from source of 
fire (m).   
 
〈𝐶〉(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) =
𝑄?̇?
𝜋𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑧𝑢
 
(9) 
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2.8.4 Jet fire 
A jet fire, also referred to as a flame jet, occurs when 
a flammable chemical is rapidly released from an 
opening in a container and immediately catches on fire—
much like the flame from a blowtorch. Thermal radiation 
is the primary hazard associated with a jet fire. Other 
potential jet fire hazards include smoke, toxic by-
products from the fire, and secondary fires and 
explosions in the surrounding area. For the modelling 
approaches presented in this paper, it is assumed that the 
release hole can be approximated as a nozzle. The 
assumption of a vertical flame will provide a 
conservative result, since the vertical flame will provide 
the largest radiant heat flux at any receptor point. Mudan 
and Croce (1988) provide review of jet flame modelling, 
begins with the calculation of the height of the flame. 
The flame height is given for turbulent gas jets burning 
in still air by Eq. (10);  
𝐿
𝑑𝑗
=  
5.3
𝐶𝑇
√
𝑇𝑓
𝑇𝑗
𝛼𝑇
[𝐶𝑇 + (1 − 𝐶𝑇)
𝑀𝑎
𝑀𝑓
]                        (10) 
where; 
L = length of the visible turbulent flame measured   
      from the break point (m) 
𝑑𝑗 = diameter of the jet, that is the physical   
         diameter of the nozzle (m) 
𝐶𝑇 = fuel mole fraction concentration in 
a stoichiometric fuel-air mixture (unitless) 
Tp, TJ = adiabatic flame temperature and jet fluid  
             temperature, respectively (K) 
αT = moles of reactant per mole of product for a  
      stoichiometric fuel-air mixture (unitless) 
Ma = molecular weight of the air (mass/mole) 
Mf = molecular weight of the fuel (mass/mole). 
 
The radiative flux at the receiver is determined from Eq. 
(11); 
𝐸𝑟 =  𝜏𝑎𝑄𝑟𝐹𝑃 = 𝜏𝑎𝜂?̇?∆𝐻𝑐𝐹𝑃                                (11) 
where; 
Er = radiant flux at the receiver (energy/area-time) 
𝜏𝑎 = atmospheric transmissivity (unitless) 
𝑄𝑟  = total energy radiated by the source    
          (energy/time)   
Fp = point source view factor, (length2) 
𝜂 = fraction of total energy converted to radiation  
?̇? = mass flow rate of the fuel (mass/time) 
∆𝐻𝑐 = energy of combustion of the fuel  
            (energy/mass). 
 
The view factor is given by Eq. (12);  
𝐹𝑃 =  
1
4𝜋𝑥2
                  (12) 
where x is the distance from the point source to the target 
(length). 
2.8.5 Level of concern for every incident 
Level of concern (LOC) for every incident outcome 
must be determined for every chemical release involved. 
It is to categorise the incident into fatal or non-fatal. For 
methanol toxicity, the LOC is determined by Acute 
Exposure Guideline Level (AEGL) where there are 
categories namely AEGL-3, AEGL-2 and AEGL-1. 
AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration which can cause 
death within 60 minutes of exposure, while AEGL-2 is 
the airborne concentration which can cause serious 
health problem. AEGL-1 categorise for the 
concentration that can cause minor health problem. The 
concentration for methanol for AEGL-3, AEGL-2, and 
AEGL-1 is 7200 ppm, 2100 ppm, and 530 ppm, 
respectively. 
Meanwhile, for CO toxicity, the LOC measurement 
also refer to AEGL to determine category of severity. 
The concentration for CO for AEGL-3 and AEGL-2 is 
330 ppm and 83 ppm, respectively, while no AEGL-1 
value is recommended. 
For value of toxicity of CO2`, the only LOC is 
immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH), which 
only has one category, causing death to the people. A 
chemical's IDLH is an estimate of the maximum 
concentration in the air to which a healthy worker could 
be exposed without suffering permanent or escape-
impairing health effects. The concentration of CO2 that 
can cause fatality or death is 40,000 ppm. 
The LOC used for VCE incident is determined by the 
level of overpressure received by receptor at certain 
location. The LOC for overpressure is categorised into 
red, orange, and yellow threat zone. The red threat zone 
is for the overpressure value of 8 psi and above, which 
can cause destruction of building. The orange threat 
zone, refers to a condition that can cause serious injury, 
with overpressure values between 3.5 and 8 psi. For the 
overpressure value between 1 and 3.5 psi, it is 
categorised into the yellow threat zone, which causes 
shatter of glass. Lastly, for determination of incident 
involving jet fire, fireball, pool fire and BLEVE, the 
LOC is determined by level of thermal radiation received 
by receptor at certain location. The LOC for thermal 
radiation is categorised into red, orange and yellow 
threat zone. The red threat zone is the value radiation of 
10k W/m2 and above, which can cause death to people 
within 60 seconds. The orange threat zone, which can 
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cause second degree burn, has range between 3.5 to10 
kW/m2. The yellow threat zone, which value is from 2 to 
3.5 kW/m2, can cause pain within 60 seconds of 
exposure. 
2.8.6 Fatality assessment 
Exposure such as toxicity, thermal radiation, and 
overpressure can be computed from area footprint in the 
simulation using ALOHA software. Area affected from 
the footprint will be the basis to calculate percentage 
fatality. Results from ALOHA will be exported to 
MARPLOT software to calculate the area affected zone 
by case studies. The events are considered fatal when the 
area affected is on the red zone threat. The ALOHA and 
MARPLOT software would demonstrate and computed 
red, orange and yellow threat zone for these events which 
the red threat zone is considered fatal and other threat are 
considered non-fatal. 
Fig. 2 provides detail of methanol production plant 
layout which has process area, workshop, 
administration, control room, tankage, utilities and flare. 
The areas affected in the footprint, which is calculated 
using MARPLOT, are then divided by total area of 
specific location to get the amount of percentage fatality. 
For example, the area affected footprint is located at 
process area zone which covered 12,000 ft2. The total 
area for process area zone is 120,000 ft2. Therefore, the 
percentage fatality calculated is 12,000 ft2/120,000 ft2, 
which is 10%. 
3.0 Results and discussion 
3.1 Conditions for plant of 76 bar and 442 bar  
Fatality assessments to these plants are based on mass 
density, volume fraction, and mass fraction of individual 
chemical in the mixture of CO2-H2-MeOH-CO- H2O. 
The first plant has a pressure of 76 bar and temperature 
of 288 °C, and the second plant operated at a pressure 
and temperature of 442 bar and 288 °C, respectively. The 
feed stream of CO2 is 80,500 kg/hr with a pressure of 1 
bar and temperature at 25°C, while H2 feed is 11,000 
kg/hr with a pressure of 30 bar and temperature is the 
same as the CO2 stream. With a series of compressors 
and intercooling, the CO2 is compressed to 76 bar, while 
H2 is compressed in a single stage to 76 bar. 
The reactor is packed with a fixed bed of 44,500 kg 
of catalyst.The product leaving the reactor is then further 
transferred into separator and distillation column. Plant 
1 process condition is referred to simulation work by 
Perez Fortes et al. (2016) and Van dal & Bouallou 
(2013). The condition of each plant is tabulated in Table 
2. Figure 3a and 3b provides process flow diagram of 
Plant 1 and 2. Meanwhile, Table A1 and A2 in Appendix 
A shows the process condition of Plant 1 and 2 which 
has mass flowrate, temperature, pressure, vapor fraction, 
and weight fraction for every stream. Plant 2 has been 
modified with added coolers and compressors to 
accommodate pressure condition to reactor of 442 bar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Plant layout of methanol plant. 
  
Table 2: Process conditions of Plant 1 and 2. 
 
Tankage 
300 × 600 ft 
 
 
 
Control room : 
100 × 100  ft 
Process area 
600 × 500 ft 
Maintenance 
and workshop 
 200 × 600 ft 
Admin  
100 ft  
Utilities:  
200 × 300 ft 
 
 
Flare : 
 200 × 300 ft 
 
 
100 ft  100ft  
100ft  
200 ft  
200 × 200 ft 
 
 
100 ft  
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Fig. 3a: Process flow diagram of Plant 1.  
Fig. 3b: Process flow diagram of Plant 2. 
3.2 Percentage fatalities of plant 76 bar 
There are 54 initiating events occurred at Plant 1 
which has minimum 1% fatality. Table 3 presents the 
list of initiating events occurred and their subjected 
fatalities. The incident involved all chemicals in the 
mixture CO2-H2-MeOH-CO-water minus water. The 
most severe event involved release of CO2 toxic at W 
and WNW direction, which has 27% fatalities, followed 
by CO2 release from SSW, contributed 26% fatalities. 
All these events occurred at night with leakage is 
catastrophic failure of vessel, 160 mm.  
Another scenario involved CO2, which was leakage 
of 25 mm at night, contributes among higher fatalities 
which are 13%. Second chemical with serious cause for 
higher fatalities is scenario involved CO, which has 9, 
10, 12, and 13% fatalities. This scenario occurred at 
wind direction W, WNW and SSW, with leakage of 25 
mm and 160 mm – day and night conditions.  
Hydrogen contributes to two incident outcome cases 
that cause fatalities, which are vapour cloud explosion 
(VCE) and jet fire. 9% fatalities caused by VCE of H2 
at instantaneous release from 160 mm leakage at day 
period while 8% fatalities occurred at night. 
Another incident of H2’s VCE from continuous 
release at 25 mm leakage causes 6% fatality for day and 
night. All of the events involved methanol only caused 
for 1% fatalities involving jet fire and toxicity. The 
toxicity incident for methanol which could cause 1% 
fatality occurred at night involved instantaneous release 
of 160 mm leakage. 
Fig. 4 shows the area affected footprint from WNW 
wind direction, for the instantaneous release of CO2, at 
night. The footprint was affected about 27 % of 
processing plant area, which is bounded by the red line 
rectangle zone. The diamond symbol is the point where 
the leakage of the vessel located. The longest red threat 
zone located at 66 meter from point source to the east 
south-east (ESE). The area affected calculated within 
process area boundary is 80,912 ft2. 
Fig. 5 shows the puff footprint from the 
instantaneous release of CO, at day, in SSW direction. 
It was affected about 8% of processing plant area, and 
5% of workshop area, totalling fatalities of 13% for this 
event. The area affected calculated is 23,589 ft2 at the 
processing area while 6,244 ft2 at workshop area. 
Fig. 6 shows the area affected footprint from W wind 
direction, for the instantaneous release of H2, at 
daytime. The footprint was affected about 8% of 
processing area, which is bounded by the red line 
rectangle zone. The longest red threat zone is located at 
35 meter from point source to the east. The area affected 
calculated within process area zone boundary is        
26,615 ft2. 
Fig. 7 shows the area affected footprint, for the 
instantaneous release of MeOH, at day. The footprint 
was affected about 1 % of processing plant area, which 
is bounded by the red line rectangle zone. The longest 
red threat zone located at 10 meter from point source at 
all wind direction. The area affected calculated within 
processing area boundary is 3,445 ft2. 
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Table 3: Initiating events percentage fatalities at plant of 76 
bar. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Puff dispersion at Plant 1–release of CO2 at night, 
160 mm leakage, 27% fatalities (from WNW wind 
direction). 
  
Fig. 5: Puff dispersion at Plant 1 –release of CO at 
day, 160 mm leakage, 13% fatalities (from SSW 
wind direction). 
  
Fig. 6: Footprint of VCE from H2, Plant 1–day, 160 mm 
leakage, 9% fatalities (from W wind direction) 
 
Fig. 7: Footprint of jet fire from MeOH, Plant 1–
day, 160 mm leakage, 1% fatality 
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3.3 Percentage fatalities of plant 442 bar 
There are 57 initiating events occurred at Plant 2 
which has minimum 1% fatality. The incident involved 
all chemicals in the mixture CO2-H2-MeOH-CO-H2O 
minus water. Table 4 presents the list of initiating events 
occurred and their subjected fatalities. The most severe 
event involved release of MeOH jet fire event at day, 
which has 44% fatalities, followed by the same event at 
night, contributed 42% fatalities. These two events 
occurred with leakage are catastrophic failures of 
vessel, 160 mm.  
Toxic event for MeOH also caused fatalities which 
are 4% at day and 2% at night, leakage from continuous 
release of 25mm hole size diameter. Second chemical 
with serious cause for higher fatalities is scenario 
involved CO2, which caused 23 to 25% fatalities. This 
scenario occurred at wind direction W, WNW and SSW, 
with leakage of 25 and 160 mm at night condition. 
Hydrogen contributes to two incident outcome cases 
that cause fatalities, which are vapour cloud explosion 
(VCE) and jet fire. 15% fatalities caused by VCE of H2 
at continuous release from 25 mm leakage at day period 
while 14% fatalities occurred at night. Another incident 
of jet fire for day and night involved 10 % fatalities. All 
of events involved CO caused severity; the highest 
amounted to 7% fatalities at day from WNW wind 
direction decreased significantly compared to release 
events at Plant 1. Meanwhile, this severity reduced 
greatly at night accounted to 2%, as the footprint of puff 
release became thinner and further away from the 
source of released. 
Fig. 8 shows the area affected footprint, for the 
instantaneous release of MeOH, at day. The footprint 
was affected about 44% of processing area, which is 
bounded by the red line rectangle zone. The longest red 
threat zone is located at 65 meter from point source at 
all wind direction. The area affected calculated within 
processing area boundary is 132,088 ft2. 
Fig. 9 shows the area affected footprint, for the 
continuous release of MeOH, 25 mm leakage, at day. 
The footprint was affected about 4 % of processing area, 
which is bounded by the red line rectangle zone. The 
longest red threat zone is located at 78 meter from point 
source to the north north-east wind location. The area 
affected calculated within processing area boundary is 
11,142 ft2. 
Fig. 10 depicted the area affected footprint, for the 
continuous release of MeOH, 25 mm leakage, at night. 
The footprint was affected about 2% of fatalities, which  
is bounded by the red line rectangle zone. 
Table 4: Initiating events percentage fatalities at plant of 
442 bar. 
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Fig. 8: Footprint of jet fire from MeOH, Plant 2–day, 160 
mm leakage, 44 % fatality. 
 
Fig. 9: Footprint of toxicity of MeOH, Plant 2–day, 25 
mm leakage, 4% fatality (from SSW wind direction). 
 
Fig. 10: Footprint of toxicity of MeOH, Plant 2– night,        
25 mm leakage, 2% fatality (from SSW wind direction). 
 
Fig. 11: Puff dispersion at Plant 2–release of CO2 at night, 
160 mm leakage, 25% fatalities (from W wind direction). 
The longest red threat zone is located at 124 m from 
point source to the north-north-east wind location. The 
area affected calculated within processing area 
boundary is 6,508 ft2. 
Fig. 11 projected the area affected footprint from W 
wind direction, for the instantaneous release of CO2, at 
night. The footprint was affected about 25% of 
processing area operators, which is bounded by the red 
line rectangle zone. The longest red threat zone located 
is at 62 m from point source to the east location. The 
area affected calculated within process area boundary is 
74,021 ft2. 
Fig. 12 indicates the area affected footprint from 
WNW wind direction, for the continuous release,       25 
mm leakage of H2, at day. The footprint was affected 15 
% fatalities, as the area covered for 15 % of processing 
area. The longest red threat zone located is at 45 meter 
from point source to the ESE location. The area affected 
calculated within process area zone boundary is 44,400 
ft2. 
Fig. 13 shows the area affected footprint, for the 
instantaneous release, 160 mm leakage of H2, at day. 
The footprint was affected 10 % fatalities, as the area 
covered for 10 % of processing area. The longest red 
threat zone located is at 30 m from point source to all 
wind direction location. The area affected calculated 
within process area zone boundary is 29,963 ft2. 
Fig. 14 and 15 shows the puff footprint from the 
instantaneous release of CO, at day, from SSW and 
WNW wind direction. The footprint of Fig. 14 was 
affected about 6% of processing plant area, but none of 
workshop area was affected, difference results from 
Plant 1. Meanwhile, Figure 15 has 7% fatalities from 
WNW direction, as the footprint affected the area 
located at ESE.  The area affected calculated is    17,261 
ft2 and 20,008 ft2 within processing area boundary for 
both CO events from SSW and WNW wind direction 
respectively. 
3.4 Analysis of result 
3.4.1 Toxic release 
Toxic release involved CO2, CO, and MeOH for both 
plants with 76 bar and 442 bar. The mass content of CO2 
is 505 kg and 401 kg with corresponding volume of 11.4 
m3 and 1 m3 for both Plant 1 and       Plant 2, respectively. 
Although the volume is greatly reduced with increasing 
pressure condition, the density of the mixture is 16.5 
times higher for 442 bar, causing the mass of CO2 
almost unaltered. Therefore, the percentage fatalities for 
both plants are not much different, only about 2–4%. 
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Fig. 12: Footprint of VCE from H2, Plant 2–day, 25 mm 
leakage, 15% fatalities (from WNW wind direction). 
 
 
Fig. 13: Footprint jet fire of from H2, Plant 2–day, 160 mm 
leakage, 10 % fatalities. 
 
Fig. 14: Puff dispersion at Plant 2–release of CO at day,  
160 mm leakage, 6% fatalities (from SSW wind direction). 
 
 
Fig. 15: Puff dispersion at Plant 2–release of CO at day, 160 
mm leakage, 7% fatalities (from WNW wind direction). 
 
In contrast, for CO, the effect of toxicity is greater 
for plant 76 bar because the mass of CO in vessel is   
88.4 kg as compared to only 14.4 kg for plant operating 
at 442 bar. As a result, the amount released to 
atmosphere is greatly reduced, causing fatalities 
reduction almost two times for plant operating at         
442 bar It can be observed, for the release from SSW 
wind direction, where the footprint did not reach the 
workshop area for Plant 2, in comparison to Plant 1, 5% 
more fatalities at this workshop, as the footprint is 
longer and wider. 
For MeOH, the amount of mass and volume 
contained in the vessel is multiplied 74 and 8.5 times, 
comparing 76 bar condition to 442 bar condition. This 
condition has substantial effect to the amount of 
percentage fatalities for both plants in term of toxicity 
effect. Plant 1 observed only 1%, while 4% fatalities 
occurred for Plant 2. The fatality caused from toxicity 
effect during daytime condition for Plant 2 is higher as 
compared to night condition because of the footprint has 
higher coverage area, although shorter footprint’s 
length is observed. The night condition has the most 
stability wind (Class F) which wind speed is 1.03 m/s as  
 
compared to daytime, which is 2.23 m/s. At night, wind 
with F stability tends to reach longer distance, while 
having reduced its concentration to left and right-side of 
the direction. 
3.4.2 Vapour cloud explosion (VCE) 
VCE incident only happens to the chemical 
hydrogen, as another flammable chemical, which is 
methanol; do not have enough concentration to produce 
area of fatality. The amount of mass increases, 
comparing between Plant 1 and 2, which are 92 kg and 
213 kg, respectively, whereas the volume reduces from 
24.4 to 6.4 m3. The mass is increased due to the density 
of mixture 20.9 m3 which rocketed up to 346 m3, 
causing mass of hydrogen increases more than double. 
The volume is decreased as more hydrogen is consumed 
to produce methanol, decreasing the amount of mole 
and affecting the volume of hydrogen itself in the 
mixture. 
As a result of increasing mass containing hydrogen 
in the vessel, the amount of release to the atmosphere is 
also higher, causing more fatalities for Plant 2 as 
compared to Plant 1. Plant operating at pressure of  442 
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bar has 15% fatalities; almost double fatalities observed 
with plant of 76 bar, involving 9% fatalities. There are 
differences in 1% fatalities for day and night condition, 
as the VCE of hydrogen tends to cover wider area at 
daytime, while smaller area is at night. It is because the 
explosion characteristic is limiting as the wind is more 
stable at night, compared to slightly unstable wind at 
day. 
3.4.3 Jet fire 
Gas released from the vessel has the probability of 
causing jet fire after immediate ignition. Highly 
flammable chemical category such as hydrogen and 
methanol are subjected to jet fire events when 
continuous and instantaneous release occurred. CO is 
also considered as flammable but only as low 
flammable chemical, with probability of causing jet fire 
only 0.02. Therefore, in this case study, CO is not 
considered as having effect of jet fire in release 
scenario. 
The quantity of chemical release for jet fire scenario 
would greatly affect the amount of area covered by 
footprint for each leakage size. The larger size of 
leakage, the greater percentage of fatalities. It can be 
observed by event when leakage of methanol from 
instantaneous release occurred. The percentage of 
fatalities observed is 44% in plant operating at 442 bar 
but reduced greatly to 1% for plant of 76 bar. The 
quantity of methanol is 9616 kg in the vessel of  442 bar 
pressure condition, compared to only 130 kg in vessel 
of 76 bar condition. 
The same result of fatalities is observed to jet fire 
event involving hydrogen. The percentage fatality is 4% 
for 76 bar plant but increases to 10% for 442 bar plant. 
It is because the mass of hydrogen in the vessel 
increases due to higher density of mixture at high 
pressure. 
4.0 Conclusions 
The assessment in this work considers a potential of 
MeOH production using high pressure condition of       
76 bar and 442 bar. Its process flow design, at a 
production scale, has been simulated in HYSYS, to 
extract the density, mass fraction, and volume fraction 
of chemical mixture in the reactor vessel in order to 
assess release characteristic of the chemicals. The 
amount of release is then evaluated using ALOHA in 
term of toxicity, thermal radiation and overpressure 
severity, transferring the footprint area affected into 
MARPLOT and calculated percentage fatality based on 
area footprint.  
Plant 1 with pressure condition of 76 bar has density 
mixture of 20.9 kg/m3 while Plant 2 with pressure 
condition of 442 bar has density mixture of 346 kg/m3. 
The mass and volume of chemical in the mixture in the 
reactor vessel are different for both plants. The volume 
of CO2 decreases drastically from 11.4 m3 to 1 m3 as 
pressure changes from 76 bar to 442 bar but its mass is 
not much different, albeit reduces slightly from 505.3 to 
401.2 kg. In contrast, the volume and mass of methanol 
in the mixture increase drastically 8.5 times and 74 
times, respectively, from 76 bar to 442 bar. The mass of 
H2 increases almost 3 times although its volume 
decreases almost 6 times from 76 to 442 bar. The 
amount of CO reduced in term of volume is more than 
52 times and mass is more than 6 times as the pressure 
condition changes from 76 to 442 bar. 
The highest percentage fatalities comparing both 
plants is the event of jet fire release at day time, from 
methanol leakage of 160 mm hole size diameter, 
resulting in 44% fatalities. The plant with pressure 
condition of 76 bar observed highest fatalities of 27%, 
which the instantaneous release of CO2 toxicity at night 
is from leakage of 160 mm hole size diameter. 
The change of pressure condition for the production 
of methanol plant from 76 to 442 bar caused more 
fatalities at 442 bar. It can be concluded that, for current 
condition, plant with 76 bar is safer compared to plant 
with 442 bar. 
As future work, the same assessment will be applied 
to risk reduction measure applied to both plants, which 
is to reduce the volume of reactor and excluding recycle 
stream for both pressure conditions. The boundaries of 
the study will be expanded, to include more pressure 
condition above 76 bar and adding risk assessment by 
combining likelihood/frequency analysis. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1: Process conditions for Plant 1. 
Stream 
number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Plant 1                  
Mass flowrate 
(kg/h) 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
11,000 11,000 
376, 
200 
376, 
200 
376, 
200 
467,600 467,600 467,600 467,600 
Pressure (bar) 1.01 3.44 3.25 9.94 9.78 23.31 23.15 76.6 30 76.6 74.3 78.5 78.3 78 77.22 76 75.5 
Temperature 
(oC) 
25 140.8 30 136.6 29 111.1 28 146.3 25 149.8 35 41 62 79 98 210 288 
Vapor fraction 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Weight fraction                  
CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.1 
CO2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.58 
H2O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 
H2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.07 
MeOH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0.15 
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Table A2: Process conditions for Plant 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stream 
number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Plant 2                     
Mass flowrate 
(kg/h) 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
80, 
500 
11,000 11,000 
376, 
200 
376, 
200 
376, 
200 
467,600 467,600 467,600 467,600 467,600 467,600 467,600 
Pressure (bar) 1.01 3.44 3.25 9.94 9.78 23.31 23.15 76.6 30 76.6 74.3 78.5 78.3 78 77.2 200 199.8 442.2 442 441.5 
Temperature 
(oC) 
25 140.8 30 136.6 29 111.1 28 146.3 25 149.8 35 41 62 79 38 163.6 38 138.2 210 288 
Vapor fraction 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Weight fraction                     
CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.001 
CO2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.03 
H2O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 
H2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.01 
MeOH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.66 
